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Abstract 
In this paper, we identify potential efficiency and equity gains from trade policy re-
forms in Mozambique. Particular attention is paid to reducing the observed high level 
of duty free importation and to studying whether differential gender specific impacts 
exist. Accordingly, the CGE model applied involves the simultaneous capturing of av-
erage and marginal tariff rates, and simulations include both a standard (non-
gender) set of experiments as well as a set where returns to male and female labor 
are distinguished. Policy reforms benefit nearly everyone with the main exception be-
ing those who benefit from duty free imports in the base. On the gender side, it turns 
out that the impact of reforms is basically neutral across factors, suggesting that, at 
the level of aggregation used here, it is difficult to uncover any major differential 
gender impacts. 
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1. Introduction 
In Mozambique, there are substantial differences between the policy stance indicated 
by published tariff rates and de facto trade policy. One way to see this difference is 
through the examination of tariff revenue. Multiplication of published tariff rates by 
estimated CIF import values for almost any product yields projected revenue levels 
that are substantially higher than the revenue actually collected. Overall, in 1997, we 
estimate that actual tariff revenue was about 40% of the level implied by de jure tariff 
rates and estimated import volumes. Mozambique is not alone in this respect. Tsikata 
(1999) and Pritchett and Sethi (1994) document large discrepancies when comparing 
revenues implied by published tariff rates and estimated import volumes with actual 
receipts for developing economies in Africa and elsewhere.2 The differences are ex-
plained by a combination of (legal) exemptions, corruption/smuggling across official 
entry points (ports and roads), and smuggling across unofficial entry points (un-
guarded borders).  
 
This paper uses a gendered CGE model for Mozambique to consider the implications 
of trade policy reform. The paper makes use of two stylized facts. First, as indicated 
above, a substantial share of imports enters the country duty free, while the remainder 
pays tariffs at published rates. These duty free imports generate substantial rents, 
which, at least in a first order sense, accrue primarily to men. Second, women have 
substantially lower educational attainment than men and tend to represent a large 
share of the rural population. Women are far more likely to work as unskilled agricul-
tural labor than men, and the overwhelming majority of women in the labor force 
work in the agricultural sector. Consequently, the implications of trade policy reform 
for agricultural labor, especially unskilled agricultural labor, are particularly impor-
tant for women.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 examines the two stylized facts in more 
detail. Section 3 presents a simplified model of international trade in order to investi-
gate theoretical issues associated with duty free imports. Section 4 discusses CGE 
models in general and presents the modifications to the CGE model necessary to add 
                                                 
2 In the data presented by Tsikata, Zimbabwe and Tanzania do slightly better than Mozambique with 
revenue collection ratios at 44 and 53 percent respectively. Other countries in the region perform 
significantly better. For example, Malawi and Zambia had measured collection ratios of 70 and 87 
percent respectively (Tsikata does not present data for Mozambique). However, these results are 
calculated on the basis of customs data and thus primarily reflect official duty exemptions. The in-
clusion of smuggling, as has been done for the Mozambican figure cited above, would drive down 
the average collection rate, likely placing the Mozambican figure roughly in the middle of the 
neighborhood of figures estimated for the region. 
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a gender dimension and handle duty free imports. Section 4 presents model simula-
tions and results, while Section 5 summarizes and concludes.  
2. Two Stylized Facts 
2.1. Import Values, Tariff Revenues, and Rents 
National accounts information combined with tariff rate data can be employed to de-
rive an implicit estimate of the value of goods entering duty free as was done above. 
A direct attempt at valuing unrecorded trade flows for Mozambique was undertaken 
by Macamo (1998). He systematically attempted to observe unrecorded cross border 
trade at major border checkpoints with neighboring countries. He estimated $98 mil-
lion in illegal trade for the year 1996.3 This amounts to only about 10% of the value 
of total trade in 1996, which is considerably less than the level of duty-free importa-
tion implied by national accounts. However, some degree of differential is appropri-
ate. Macamo focused on cross border trade with Mozambique’s neighbors while sig-
nificant imports also arrive from overseas. In addition, Macamo focused on small, 
relatively unsophisticated operators with larger presumably more sophisticated opera-
tors “not necessarily” included (Macamo, 1998, p. 12). Finally, Macamo did not ob-
serve legal exemptions, which constitute a significant share of duty free imports. So, 
while the degree of precision in all of these figures leaves much to be desired, these 
two estimates of unrecorded trade paint a qualitatively similar picture of large vol-
umes of goods entering the country duty free.  
 
Since substantial volumes of goods enter Mozambique duty free, the overall average 
tariff rate (total tariff revenue divided by the total CIF value of imports) in 1997 was 
relatively low at 6.9%. Nevertheless, substantial volumes of imports do arrive through 
official channels and pay duty at the published or marginal rate, which is typically 
well above the average rate. The marginal import appears to be tariff inclusive; so, the 
price of traded goods within the country reflects the world price and the associated 
marginal tariff rate. When tariff rates are high, significant benefits therefore accrue to 
those individuals with the ability to import duty free either through legal exemptions 
or through smuggling/corruption at official border points.  
 
While benefits clearly accrue to those with the ability to import duty free, incentives 
also exist to incur substantially higher transportation costs in order to move goods 
clandestinely across official and unofficial entry points. In this case, some share of the 
                                                 
3 In fact, Macamo estimated unrecorded trade for the period December 1995 to November 1996. 
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rents associated with bringing a good into Mozambique without paying duty is ab-
sorbed in real resource costs. Macamo (1998) finds evidence for this. For example, 
border traders wishing to evade tariffs often divide goods into small lots and hire nu-
merous transporters to bring the goods across the border before re-amassing the con-
traband for transport to consumption centers. This is clearly much more expensive 
than simply driving the goods across the border in a truck. However, the evidence col-
lected by Macamo confirms that the large majority of unrecorded cross border trans-
actions (with neighboring countries) either passes through or very close to official en-
try points.4 Some simply passes straight through in trucks with very minor to no in-
crement in transport costs relative to official imports. Even when dissembled into 
smaller lots, the incremental transport cost appears to be small compared to the value 
of the tariffs avoided. Macamo considers beer head transported, which draws an in-
cremental transport cost of only about 10-15% of the value of the tariffs avoided. Re-
garding international seaports, one would expect incremental transport costs to be 
relatively small since the options in terms of physical transport are much more lim-
ited. Incremental transport costs are almost surely about zero for officially exempted 
goods.  
 
Table 1 shows import values and actual tariff revenue according to the commodity 
classification employed in the social accounting matrix (SAM) underlying the com-
putable general equilibrium (CGE) model employed for analysis in this paper.5 About 
44% of the value of imports entered the country duty free in 1997 despite positive 
posted tariff rates. However, as indicated in the Table, duty free imports tend to be 
concentrated in sectors with higher posted tariff rates.6 Therefore, as indicated above, 
tariff revenue forgone due to unrecorded trade and legal exemptions amounts to about 
60% of the total tariff revenue implied by the multiplication of posted tariff rates with 
actual import volumes.  
 
 
                                                 
4 Given the underdeveloped state and characteristics of the existing transport infrastructure, this is 
not surprising. 
5 The SAM can be obtained from the authors on request. 
6 In many cases, the same posted tariff rate does not apply across all the goods comprising the ag-
gregate commodities shown in Table 1. As a result, aggregation of posted tariff rates is necessary 
in order to determine the actual tariff rate that should be applied. A number of complex conceptual 
issues are associated with appropriate aggregation of tariff rates. These issues are explored in 
Bach, Martin and Stevens (1996), among other sources.  In Table 1, the posted tariff rates reflect 
weighted averages of import volumes with a small corrective factor to account for the fact that 
higher tariffs tend to drive down import volumes. 
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Table 1. Import values, tariff rates, and tariff revenues for 1997 (in billions of me-
tical).  
  
 
 
Sector 
Import
Value
Published
Tariff
Rate (%)
Implied
Tariff
Revenue
Actual
Tariff
Revenue
Share 
Missing 
(%) 
  
Primary Ag. Crops 662 10.0 66 60 9.6 
Primary Ag. Livestock 85 10.0 8 6 29.5 
Forestry and Firewood 5 46.1 2 2 0.0 
Extraction 77 12.5 10 9 3.2 
Food Processing 1,803 35.0 631 117 81.4 
Beverages and Tobacco 298 35.0 104 17 83.4 
Primary Product Processing 1,046 35.0 366 62 83.1 
Chemicals 2,022 15.0 303 165 45.7 
Other Manufactures 4,172 15.0 626 381 39.0 
Other Services 168 0.0 0 0 0.0 
Construction 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 
Commerce 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 
Transport and Communication 140 0.0 0 0 0.0 
Insurance and Finance  1,308 0.0 0 0 0.0 
Public Administration and Def. 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 
Education 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 
Health 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 
Labor Intensive Services 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 
Big Projects 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 
Big Project Imports 45 0.0 0 0 0.0 
  
Total or Weighted Average 11,831 17.9 2,117 820 61.3 
 
Sources: National accounts for 1997 for import volumes and tariff revenues and Pauta Aduaneira for pub-
lished tariff rates.  
Notes: In 1997, there were approximately 11,406 Mt/USD.  
 Totals may not  add up due to rounding.  
 
 
Protection rates are highest for Food Processing, Beverages and Tobacco, and Pri-
mary Product Processing (which include textiles, clothing, and leather products). The 
rates for exemptions and unrecorded trade in these categories are estimated to be par-
ticularly high as well with more than 80% of the value of these products entering the 
country duty free (value shares and shares of tariff revenue foregone are the same in 
this instance since a flat rate of 35% was applied to all goods in these three catego-
ries). The commodity composition observed by Macamo also reflects this concentra-
tion of unrecorded trade in these three commodity categories. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that Processed Food, Beverages and Tobacco, and Primary 
Product Processing represent an important part of consumers’ budgets. The 1997 
SAM indicates that these products accounted for about 29% and 37% of total expen-
diture for rural and urban households respectively. Consequently, price changes for 
these commodities have the potential to impact household welfare fairly strongly. 
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The high volume of goods entering duty free and concomitant low revenue collection 
ratios have strong implications for the revenue effects from trade policy reform. In 
principle, the revenue-reducing effects of reducing peak rates could be offset by their 
application to a broader base through elimination of official exemptions and reduc-
tions in incentives to smuggle. In a review of detailed tariff line and collection rate 
data for three countries, Pritchett and Sethi (1994) find that reductions in peak rates 
would likely have minimal or even positive revenue effects. Under these circum-
stances, the allocative efficiencies of trade liberalization are realized (as long as mar-
ginal or published tariff rates define domestic prices) while government revenue re-
mains essentially the same. The primary losers are individuals with the ability to im-
port duty free and those receiving corruption payments. It can be safely assumed that 
the poor, including in particular poor women, are unlikely to figure prominently 
among this group. 
2.2. Male and Female Labor 
Data from the 1997 Mozambique census confirmed the widely held belief that women 
have significantly lower educational attainment than men (NIS, 1997). According to 
the census, women represented about one of three persons who had completed upper 
primary school (EP2) and only about one in four persons who had completed any 
level of secondary school. While current enrollment rates paint a slightly more favor-
able picture, enrollments of boys still substantially exceed enrollments of girls espe-
cially at higher levels in the school system. This implies that gender inequalities in 
educational attainment (and hence human capital) are likely to endure for a consider-
able period of time (MINED, 2001). The 1997 census also picked up continued strong 
demographic effects of the civil war (which ended in 1992) and work related migra-
tion. Due to these effects, women represented 55% of the working age population (de-
fined as the population greater than 15) in rural areas in 1997. 
 
Arndt (2003) used census data, national accounts data, labor force data, and education 
data to break the labor force in Mozambique into skill categories. Building on this 
work, we employed the same sources augmented by cross checks with the 2001 
QUIBB survey (NIS, 2001) to disaggregate these categories by gender. The results 
are presented in Tables 2, 3, and 4. The categories correspond to functionally illiterate 
and enumerate (unskilled), literate and numerate up to secondary or technical school 
level (skilled), and tertiary educated (highly skilled). The Tables illustrate an econ-
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omy with an extremely thin human capital base. Consistent with available data, the 
human capital base among women is particularly thin.7 
 
Table 2. Employment by gender, sector, and skill class (in thousand)  
  
 Femal Male Total 
  
Unskilled Ag Labor 3,173 2,206 5,379 
Skilled Ag Labor 88 258 346 
Unskilled Non-Ag Labor 256 593 848 
Skilled Non-Ag Labor 65 192 257 
Highly Skilled Non-Ag Labor 15 45 60 
  
Total 3,596 3,294 6,890 
 
Source:  Arndt (2203); 1997 census data; 1997 national accounts data; and authors’ calculations. 
Note: Totals may not add up due to rounding.  
 
 
Table 3. Employment row shares (in %)  
  
 Femal (%) Male (%) Total (%) 
  
Unskilled Ag Labor 59.0 41.0 100.0 
Skilled Ag Labor 25.3 74.7 100.0 
Unskilled Non-Ag Labor 30.1 69.9 100.0 
Skilled Non-Ag Labor 25.2 74.8 100.0 
Highly Skilled Non-Ag Labor 25.3 74.7 100.0 
  
Total 52.2 47.8 100.0 
 
 
 
Table 4. Employment column shares (in %) 
  
 Femal (%) Male (%) Total (%) 
  
Unskilled Ag Labor 88.2 67.0 78.1 
Skilled Ag Labor 2.4 7.8 5.0 
Unskilled Non-Ag Labor 7.1 18.0 12.3 
Skilled Non-Ag Labor 1.8 5.8 3.7 
Highly Skilled Non-Ag Labor 0.4 1.4 0.9 
  
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
  
Note: Totals may not add up due to rounding. 
 
 
  
Due to the predominance of women in rural areas and their lack of educational at-
tainment, women represent 59% of the unskilled agricultural labor force (see Table 
3). By the same basic logic, agricultural labor utterly dominates the economic activi-
                                                 
7 More detail on gender issues can be found in UNDP (2002). 
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ties undertaken by women with nearly nine of 10 working women engaged in the ag-
ricultural sector. These figures indicate that the fortunes of women in Mozambique 
are, for the foreseeable future, strongly linked to the performance of the agricultural 
sector. 
3. A Simple Model of Trade and Tariffs with Missing Revenue 
In order to motivate the empirical modeling approach employed in the paper, a very 
simple model of international trade is developed in this section. The model contains 
three goods: an importable that is not produced domestically (M), an exportable that 
is produced but not consumed domestically (E), and a non-tradeable that is produced 
and consumed domestically (D). There are h households with identical Cobb-Douglas 
preferences. Each household has a labor endowment zh. Production technology is li-
near in labor units, and the usual neoclassical behavioral assumptions apply.8 The 
mathematical form of the model is as follows: 
 
Consumer demand for M MhPm = (1 - α)Yh (1) 
Consumer demand for D DhPd  = αYh (2) 
Consumer budget constraint Yh =  zhW +Th (3) 
E production technology E = aLE (4) 
D production technology ΣhDh = bLD (5) 
E first order condition W = apweR (6) 
D first order condition W = bPd (7) 
Trade balance pweE = pwmΣhDh (8) 
Price transmission Pm  = pwm(1 + t)R (9) 
Government balance ΣhTh = tΣhMhpwmR (10) 
Numeraire definition R ≡ 1 (11) 
Factor market balance LE  + LD = Σhzh + WAL (12) 
 
where (ignoring subscripts) L represents labor allocations, W the wage, P prices (pw 
indicates fixed world price), R the exchange rate, t the tariff rate applied to imports, α 
the share of household budget devoted to good D, and T transfers. Variables are in 
uppercase while parameters are in lower case. The variable WAL effectively drops 
the factor market balance equation (12) in accordance with Walras’ law. Note that tar-
iff revenue is distributed back to households in the form of direct transfers (equation 
                                                 
8 The model is motivated by the 1-2-3 model of Devarajan, Lewis, and Robinson (1990). This model 
is simplified by assuming perfect transformation between domestics (D) and exports (E). 
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10). Also note that the model, as given above, is incomplete as the distribution of 
transfers, Th, across households has not yet been specified. Finally, note that by solv-
ing for Pm and Pd and substituting into equation sets (1) and (2), the model boils down 
to a system of linear equalities (assuming the allocation mechanism for transfers is 
linear). Accordingly, the model can be solved as long as the matrix of parameters is 
invertible. 
 
For our purposes, the closed form solution is not strictly necessary. Rather, it suffices 
to note that all prices, including the wage, can be determined as a function of the tariff 
rate t, the production parameters a and b, world prices pwe and pwm, and the exchange 
rate R, which is serving as the numeraire. As a result, from an individual household 
perspective, income is exogenously determined by the household specific labor en-
dowment and the level of government transfer. Production side issues are essentially 
abstracted from and changes in welfare are determined uniquely by changes in prices 
(through, for example, changes in the tariff rate) and changes in transfer income.  
 
The model is used to consider three separate situations, which are relevant for Mo-
zambique. 
 
 
1) A completely ineffective tariff. 
2) A tariff with a legal exemption scheme under which some particular 
groups are allowed access to goods duty free. 
3) Smuggling/corruption.  
 
Situation 1 can be dealt with quickly. If the tariff is completely ineffective, then the 
operational tariff rate is zero. There is no revenue to distribute. And, the model arrives 
at the free trade solution. It is worth noting that the same solution can be obtained via 
an offsetting consumer subsidy. The addition of a consumer subsidy on the purchase 
of imports can be achieved by modifying two equations of the model as follows. 
 
Consumer demand for M MhPm(1 - s) = (1 - α)Yh (1a) 
Government balance ΣhTh = t ΣhMhpwmR - s ΣhMhPm (10a) 
 
It is straightforward to show that, if (1 - s)(1 + t) = 1, the free trade equilibrium is re-
established.  
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Situation 2 recognizes the existence of enclave entities that often receive special trade 
treatment. For example, expatriates and locals who travel frequently are frequently 
able to avoid paying import tariffs. Government often exempts itself from import tar-
iffs, and large investment projects negotiate special import treatment. Here, the mar-
kets for imports are divided. Some groups import and consume with tariff laden prices 
while others import and consume at world prices. We focus on division of markets 
across households in our simplified model. This situation requires further modifica-
tion to the model. The market division can be achieved in at least two ways. First, a 
subscript h could be added to the tariff rate, t. In this case, only certain groups pay the 
tariff. This modification also requires an h subscript on the domestic price of imports 
Pm. Alternatively, an offsetting consumption subsidy to specific households, sh, can 
achieve the same outcome when a single tariff rate is applied in a manner completely 
analogous to the ineffective tariff situation considered above. These modifications are 
shown below. 
 
Consumer demand for M MhPhm(1 - sh) = (1 - α)Yh (1b) 
Price transmission Phm = pwm(1 + th)R (9b) 
Government balance ΣhTh = th ΣhMhpwmR - sh ΣhMhPhm (10b) 
 
Any given household j faces free trade prices if (1 - sj) (1 + tj) =1. Further, in this sim-
ple model, if household j also receives zero transfers, then it faces the free trade 
equilibrium.  
 
Situation 3 captures the basic elements of smuggling and/or corruption. Suppose that 
household j possesses the means and/or rights to import duty free. It both imports 
commodities duty free for direct consumption and imports and resells commodities at 
the tariff laden price. This situation can be modeled by setting (1 - sj) (1 + tj) = 1 (only 
for household j). Resale of imported products at the tariff laden price can be captured 
by imposing the posted rate tariff rate t on imports of these goods but directing the 
value of this tariff revenue to household j in the form of a transfer, Tj. Effectively, 
household j consumes at world prices and enjoys revenue by importing at world 
prices and selling at tariff laden domestic prices.  
 
The world is, of course, much more complicated than the simple model presented 
above. However, the model above does capture the most important elements of tariff 
avoidance, namely who gets the benefits from this avoidance. In addition, the simple 
model provides insights into modeling strategies for a more complex empirical model. 
The simple neoclassical world where domestic prices are fixed by world prices is ana-
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lytically convenient. It is also, in our view, appropriate for the case of the same good 
imported under different regimes. In other words, once safely within Mozambique, it 
seems logical to view smuggled beer and officially imported beer as indistinguishable 
products. These ideas are woven into a more complex empirical model of interna-
tional trade, which is explained in the following section. 
4. Modeling Approach 
The basic purpose of trade liberalization is to alter relative prices, including factor 
prices, in order to expand production in sectors with comparative advantage. To ex-
pand production, these sectors must attract factors of production (land, labor, and ca-
pital). Under most conditions, other industries must release factors of production in 
order to permit those industries with comparative advantage to expand. Using this 
perspective, trade liberalization is inherently an economy-wide phenomenon. Here, 
we are particularly interested in analyzing trade policy reform that attempts to exploit 
the low import tariff coverage ratios observed in the data. At the same time, we wish 
to formally maintain a gender perspective. For these purposes, we opt to employ an 
economy-wide modeling perspective.  
 
4.1. Economy-wide Models 
Before describing the Mozambique economy-wide model specifically, it is perhaps 
worthwhile to review the basic characteristics of a standard static economy-wide mo-
del. These models are often referred to as computable general equilibrium (CGE) mo-
dels. The specific features of the Mozambique model can then be highlighted. CGE 
models can be thought of as containing four basic elements: 
  
a) Behavioral specification; 
b) Accounting constraints;  
c) Treatment of imports and exports; and, 
d) Market closure. 
 
These elements are treated in what follows in turn. 
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4.1.1. Behavioral Specification 
In any economic model, the behavior of the agents must be specified.  For example, 
firms are often assumed to maximize profits subject to available technology and tak-
ing prices for inputs and outputs as given.  Likewise, households are regularly as-
sumed to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint.  These are also the most 
common assumptions applied to CGE models.  In addition, other agents are usually 
contained in a CGE.  For example, government receives revenue through taxes and 
other sources and purchases commodities.  Enterprises earn financial profits (returns 
to capital) and either distribute dividends or retain the earnings for investment pur-
poses.  Investors, through the purchase of commodities in order to form capital, de-
termine the commodity composition of investment.  Just as for firms and households, 
expenditure allocation rules must be specified for these additional agents.  The rules 
can be simple or complex.  For a simple example, all agents could allocate available 
funds across uses in constant budget shares. More complex rules can also be applied 
to account for issues such as risk, imperfect competition, or returns to scale. 
4.1.2. Accounting Constraints 
The behavioral specifications within CGE models follow from economic theory and 
rarely set them apart from other economic models.  The accounting equations, on the 
other hand, are a major distinguishing feature from partial equilibrium models.  CGE 
models contain a number of identities that enforce consistency.  For example: 
 
a) Households must respect their budget constraint; 
b) The domestic price of imports equals the CIF price multiplied by the ex-
change rate and the prevailing tariff rate plus any marketing margins or 
additional domestic sales taxes; 
c) The value of imports cannot exceed the availability of foreign exchange; 
d) Supply of commodities must equal demand for commodities (with inven-
tory accumulation counted as demand); 
e) Firms cannot use more of any factor than the total availability in the 
economy;  
f) Investment must be financed via foreign or domestic savings; and, 
g) Government consumption must be financed through tax revenue, foreign 
grants (aid), or borrowing on domestic or foreign markets. 
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These propositions are in large measure a matter of accounting; however, they serve 
to circumscribe the range of possible outcomes, sometimes surprisingly tightly.  For 
example, skilled labor is often fully employed.  This implies that, for a given stock of 
skilled labor, if an industry expands output and uses more skilled labor in the process, 
other industries must use less skilled labor.  To achieve equilibrium in the various fac-
tor and product markets, prices adjust to simultaneously satisfy the decision rules and 
the accounting constraints. 
4.1.3. Exports and Imports 
As in most models with foreign trade, exports and imports receive special treatment.9  
While the ideal special treatment remains a matter of considerable debate, it is clearly 
incorrect to assume that a domestic commodity and the same commodity being im-
ported or exported are homogeneous (with the possible exception of trade in bulk 
commodities such as rice between similar countries).  For the vast majority of traded 
commodities, the empirical evidence is overwhelming that imports, exports, and do-
mestic goods are differentiated products.  The exact form of differentiation and the 
degree of differentiation remains contentious. The most common practice in CGE 
modeling is to adopt the “Armington assumption,” whereby products are distin-
guished by country of origin (Armington, 1969).  Other assumptions are possible.  For 
example, goods might be differentiated by firm.  So Honda automobiles might be 
considered the same wherever they are produced, but they differ from Ford automo-
biles.  In a single country CGE model employing the Armington assumption, there are 
three goods associated with each commodity:  imports, exports, and domestically 
produced goods for domestic consumption.  
4.1.4. Closure 
The final issue, closure, pertains to the macroeconomic characteristics of the economy 
in question.  Is a fixed or flexible exchange rate regime pursued?  Do taxes adjust to 
maintain an arbitrary alignment between government revenue and expenditures or 
does the government deficit adjust?  Are factors of production fully employed and are 
they mobile across productive activities?  Is investment driven by the available sav-
ings pool, or do savings adjust somehow to accommodate an exogenous investment 
                                                 
9 Treatment of exports and imports really falls under the heading of behavioral specification. How-
ever, since the treatment of foreign trade is crucial to many applications, a separate section is de-
voted to this part of the model. 
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level?  These questions are addressed through the choice of macroeconomic closure, a 
seminal paper being Sen (1963). 
 
Results from CGE models are often sensitive to the choice of closure.  This character-
istic is sometimes cited as a weakness of CGE models. We see it as a strong point. 
Economic outcomes do vary substantially depending upon macroeconomic character-
istics and policies.  For example, if the defense build-up pursued by the United States 
under President Ronald Reagan had been tax financed rather than deficit financed, the 
economic structure of the United States towards the end of the 1980s would arguably 
have been very different (see, for example, McKibbin, 1992).  Alternative closures 
permit the models to capture these alternative characteristics and outcomes. 
 
In summary, CGE models combine behavioral specifications for a large number of 
agents in the economy with accounting constraints and a view of the macroeconomic 
policy regime and the nature of product differentiation in international trade.  
4.2. The Mozambique CGE Model and SAM 
The Mozambique CGE model is a fairly standard CGE model with a few special fea-
tures. Relatively standard elements are discussed first. More novel features are then 
presented.  
 
The model assumes profit maximization by producers under translog technology and 
utility maximization with Cobb-Douglas preferences by consumers. The government 
implicitly maximizes a Cobb-Douglas utility function (constant expenditure shares) 
while investment is allocated in a Leontief fashion (a fixed basket of goods). The 
Armington assumption is employed with constant elasticity of transformation func-
tions on the export side and constant elasticity of substitution functions on the import 
side. The external sector of the model is closed by fixing foreign currency inflows 
(primarily aid) and allowing the exchange rate to adjust. Investment is driven by 
available savings. Finally, the government deficit is fixed (more details on govern-
ment closure are provided in the simulations section).  The model numeraire is the 
consumer price index. 
 
A somewhat less standard feature is the division of labor types by sex. As mentioned 
above, the labor types included in the model are listed in Table 2. These labor types, 
differentiated by sex, constitute separate inputs into the translog production function. 
Elasticities of substitution between male and female labor of the same class were set 
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at the fairly high level of three. Elasticities across labor classes employ the values 
used by Arndt (2003) regardless of sex.   
 
This approach formally captures the concentration of female labor in the agricultural 
sector, and explicitly brings the implications of trade policy reform for female labor 
into consideration. Arndt and Tarp (2000) employed a similar approach to examine 
the interactions between agricultural technology, risk, and gender. More detailed for-
mulations have been developed. For example, Fontana and Wood (2000) present a 
fairly stylized model for Bangladesh, which explicitly considers household work (and 
leisure) along with the division between male and female labor. 
 
While the incorporation of these aspects into macroeconomic models such as CGE 
models represents a step forward, ample room for progress remains. In particular, the 
authors are unaware of a macroeconomic model that explicitly addresses issues asso-
ciated with intra-household resource allocation. Our model shares this deficiency. 
Consequently, we are unable to analyze the implications of trade policy reform for 
resource allocation within the household.10   
 
Finally, detailed accounting for marketing margins is accomplished in the same man-
ner as described in Arndt, Jensen, Robinson, and Tarp (2000) and Jensen and Tarp 
(2002). Löfgren, Harris and Robinson (2001) and Tarp, Arndt, Jensen, Robinson and 
Heltberg (2002) provide detailed explanations of the basic CGE model that was revi-
sed for the purposes of this analysis. 
 
The novel feature of the Mozambique model as applied here involves the simultane-
ous capturing of average and marginal tariff rates when these diverge. As shown in 
Table 1, such differences are substantial in Mozambique. When confronted with this 
situation the CGE modeler has traditionally faced a choice. One can apply the average 
tariff rate, which gets revenue correct. This is clearly desirable in public finance ap-
plications. However, this approach understates the true import tariff wedge at the 
margin, which is in focus in trade policy analysis. Alternatively, one can apply the 
published rate, which overstates tariff revenue, but captures the distortions inherent in 
trade policy. 
                                                 
10 This is an area of research that could be accomplished. For the case of Mozambique, a major con-
straining factor is a dearth of information on how resources are allocated within the household 
(Bell, 2003). The analysis could be performed in a setting where more information is available. 
Alternatively, planned qualitative and quantitative research in Mozambique might provide an 
adequate empirical basis on which to proceed. 
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In practice, modeling goals (and expedience) have guided analytical choices. For ex-
ample, GTAP data usually reflect published (marginal) tariff rates since most users 
are trade policy focused and the model is relatively poorly suited to public finance 
applications (McDougall and Dimaran, 2002). On the other hand, a series of studies 
of southern African economies conducted by the International Food Policy Research 
Institute typically employed average tariff rates since the public finance dimensions 
of these studies maintained a higher profile (see, for example, Tarp, Arndt, Jensen, 
Robinson and Heltberg, 2002). 
 
While the choice has typically been one or the other, both the average and the mar-
ginal rates can in fact be captured in a CGE model using the analytical model derived 
above. In large part, the issue can also be viewed as a tariff rate quota where a certain 
volume of imports enters the country duty free and the remainder enters the country at 
a strictly positive tariff rate (i.e. the published tariff rate). As in the case of a tariff rate 
quota, the ability to import duty free (or at the within quota rate) has a value. For 
those with access to goods duty free, the tariff revenue foregone by the government 
effectively represents income in the form of either a rent or an implicit subsidy. With 
relatively few modifications, the basic machinery for modeling tariff rate quotas can 
be applied to the issue of low rates of tariff revenue collection in Mozambique (see 
Elbehri and Pearson (2000) for general equilibrium analysis of tariff rate quotas). 
 
In this particular case, the implicit value of tariffs avoided is calculated for each 
commodity. The actual tariff inclusive import value of all commodities is then aug-
mented by the respective amounts of tariff payments avoided through (legal or illegal) 
duty free importation in order to obtain the CIF value of imports augmented by the 
full amount of tariff revenue implied by published rates. From the theory discussion 
presented above, the destination of this virtual tariff revenue (the tariff revenue not 
actually collected by government) depends upon the use of the imported commodity. 
If it is imported and then consumed directly, the importing/consuming agent could be 
viewed as paying the import tariff and then receiving an exactly offsetting consumer 
subsidy. If the good is imported and then resold at tariff laden prices, then the import-
ing agent could be viewed as receiving a transfer from the government equivalent to 
the value of the tariff revenue avoided.  
 
There is very little information to indicate the share of duty free imports that is con-
sumed directly and the corresponding share that is resold at tariff laden prices. Legal 
exemptions would tend to fall into the former category while smuggled goods would 
tend to fall into the latter. The available evidence indicates that both of these catego-
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ries are important. However, for Beverages and Tobacco, Food Processing and Pri-
mary Product Processing, where tariff rates and tariff avoidance are the highest, the 
share that is resold at tariff laden prices likely predominates. In this light, we assume 
that 33% of duty free imports are consumed directly and the remaining 67% are im-
ported and resold. Further, we assume that government, investment, and urban house-
hold accounts have some ability to import duty free and consume directly. Rents 
(modeled as transfers) from importing duty free and reselling at tariff-laden prices are 
assumed to accrue to urban households.11 Rural households, on the other hand, are 
assumed not to have access to duty free goods. 
 
In the model, price linkage equations remain exactly as before. So, for example, im-
port prices are equal to the world price converted to domestic currency times the sum 
of one plus the marginal tariff rate (plus any marketing margins). The tariff revenue 
side differs. Similar to the perspective of duty free imports as a tariff rate quota, we 
assume, on a commodity by commodity basis, that a certain fraction of imports enters 
the country duty free while the remaining fraction pays marginal tariffs. Actual tariff 
revenue in the government revenue equation becomes this fraction multiplied by the 
value of tariffs implied by the full marginal tariff rate. The remaining amount, the 
value of tariffs avoided, is divided between consumption subsidies (relating to goods 
that are consumed directly) and direct transfers to urban households (relating to goods 
that are imported and then resold). 
5. Simulations and Results 
5.1. Simulations 
Table 5 illustrates the simulations undertaken with the model. In the first, labeled “All 
Products Pay”, the share of products imported duty free is set to zero while all tariff 
rates are adjusted proportionately to maintain revenue neutrality with respect to all 
indirect taxes (not just tariff revenue). Consumption subsidies reflecting direct con-
sumption of products imported duty free are also set to zero. This corresponds to a 
fictional scenario where all legal exemptions are eliminated and all smuggling is hal-
ted. In the second, labeled “Flat Tariff Rates”, all positive tariff rates are reset to a 
                                                 
11 To simplify the modeling, the real resource costs associated with importing duty free are assumed 
to be zero. If real resource outlays to avoid tariffs are indeed a relatively small share of the value 
of tariffs avoided, as the available evidence suggests, then this simplification is harmless. The 
other case, involving significant real resource outlays, has been examined in the seminal paper by 
Krueger (1974) among others. 
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single level that maintains revenue neutrality with respect to all indirect taxes.12 The 
share of products imported duty free remains constant. Consumption subsidies adjust 
to offset the level of virtual tariff revenue associated with direct consumption of duty 
free imports. In the third, labeled “Both”, the share of products imported duty free 
drops to zero and all positive tariff rates are reset to a single rate. This rate is adjusted 
to maintain revenue neutrality with respect to all indirect taxes. 
 
Table 5. Simulations  
 
Label Description 
  
Base Base data in billions of meticais. 
  
 
All products pay 
The share of products imported duty free drops to zero while tariff rates are 
adjusted proportionately to maintain revenue neutrality. 
  
 
Flat tariff rates 
All positive tariff rates are reset to a single level that maintains revenue neu-
trality. The share of products imported duty free remains constant. 
  
 
 
Both 
The share of products imported duty free drops to zero and all positive tariff 
rates are reset to a single rate. This rate is adjusted to maintain revenue 
neutrality  
 
 
The simulations are designed to investigate the implications of a lower tax rate ap-
plied to a wider base, a very common public finance application. In this case, we are 
also careful to track the implications for male and female labor. As in most public fi-
nance applications, careful attention is given to the maintenance of revenue neutrality. 
Maintenance of total indirect tax revenue was also targeted since these are the taxes 
that interfere with the price system. The value of indirect taxes (less output subsidies) 
represented 75% of government revenue in 1997. Changes in revenue from indirect 
taxes have implications for welfare analysis. As shown by Robinson and Thierfelder 
(1999), changes in indirect tax rates that change indirect tax revenue invalidate wages 
as an acceptable welfare indicator. With the revenue closure adopted, wages remain 
an acceptable welfare indicator (at least for the large majority of the population that 
lacks rights to import duty free). 
 
The motivating notion behind the simulations is that lower tariff rates substantially 
reduce the incentives to evade tariffs. Therefore, revenue neutrality is maintained in 
all simulations. In order to separate out effects, the first simulations consider what 
happens if all duty free importation could be eliminated. The second scenario consid-
                                                 
12 As Table 1 indicates, the tariff rate applied to some imports, particularly services, is zero in the 
base. These rates remain at zero in all simulations. 
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ers the implications of applying a single flat tariff rate to all commodities while the 
share of commodities entering the country duty free remains the same. These two sce-
narios are both unrealistic. The first would be impossible to achieve. In the second, 
one would expect the share of duty free imports to decline endogenously in sectors 
with high tariff levels. However, the two scenarios define two extreme points in the 
policy set of interest.  
 
The third scenario combines the first two scenarios to create a scenario of potential 
policy interest. This scenario asks the question: “what flat tariff rate applied to all im-
ported commodities (excluding commodities with a tariff rate of zero in the base) 
would be required to maintain revenue assuming all imported goods paid tariffs at the 
published rate, and what are the welfare implications, including implications by gen-
der, of this policy?”  
 
All scenarios were run using a gendered model and a more standard model without a 
gender dimension. Results from the standard (no gender dimension) are presented and 
analyzed first. Next, the implications of adding a gender dimension to the model are 
assessed. 
5.2. Results 
Macroeconomic results for the non-gendered model are illustrated in Table 6. Trade 
expands in all scenarios. Growth in trade is led by increased imports of processed 
food, beverages and tobacco, and processed primary products, which are associated 
with the highest initial rates of protection. Reductions in tariff rates applied to these 
products are large in all scenarios. In scenario one, the existing rate structure is re-
duced by nearly two thirds (see the Tariff Rate Expansion Factor at the bottom of the 
Table). Consequently, rates on these three commodities decline from 35% to about 
12%. In scenario two, duty free shares remain constant but tariffs are reset to a single 
flat rate of about 17% (the flat tariff rate is equal to the Tariff Rate Expansion Factor). 
For most commodities, this involves a tariff rate increase, which tends to reduce trade 
volumes; however, for the three highly taxed commodities mentioned above, tariffs 
decline by 18 percentage points. The net effect is a very small increase in trade vol-
umes in this scenario.  
 
Scenario three involves the elimination of exemptions and the application of a flat tar-
iff rate. Under these conditions, revenue neutrality can be maintained with a 7% tariff 
rate. This involves a substantial tariff rate cut for each of the commodity aggregates. 
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However, trade expands less than in scenario one (All products pay) since importing 
duty free and consuming directly is no longer an option. All products are assessed du-
ties.13 The expansion of imports induces a devaluation of the currency in order to 
stimulate import competing and exporting sectors. Due to the very large level of ex-
ternal financing received by Mozambique, the value of imports massively exceeds the 
value of exports. As a result, exports must grow by proportionately much more for a 
given proportional change in imports in order to maintain external balance. Real GDP 
changes little in all scenarios; however, total absorption – a measure of economy-
wide welfare – increases mildly in the “Flat” and “Both” scenarios. 
 
Table 6. Macroeconomic results for the non-gendered model.  
  
 
Base
All products
pay (%)
Flat Tariff
rates (%)
 
Both (%) 
  
Exchange Rate 1.00 5.0 1.4 5.0 
Real GDP 40,609 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Total Absorption  48,357 0.0 0.4 0.3 
Imports 11,831 1.7 0.0 1.4 
Exports 4,083 4.9 0.1 4.2 
Investment 8,173 3.9 -0.3 3.0 
  
Tariff Rate Expansion Factor1) 1.00 0.35 0.17 0.07 
 
Note: All metical figures are in billions. Also, the levels of some macroeconomic aggregates differ slightly 
from published values due to more explicit accounting for the rents associated with duty-free importa-
tion.  
 
1The tariff rate expansion factor is not in percentage terms and the interpretation of this factor differs by sce-
nario. In scenarios “Base” and “All products pay”, the factor multiplies existing marginal tariff rates. In 
scenarios “Flat tariff rates” and “Both”, the factor still multiplies all tariff rates; however, these are all set to 
one. So, the expansion factor is the unique tariff rate applied to all goods with strictly positive tariff rates in 
these two scenarios.  
 
 
Table 7 provides information on the contribution of each sector to real GDP at factor 
cost in the base, the level of value added generated by each sector, and the percentage 
change in real value added generated by each producing sector for each scenario. Fo-
cusing on the third scenario (“Both”), one observes some changes in the composition 
of value added, but they are not dramatic. Small sectors that enjoyed substantial pro-
tection, such as Beverages and Tobacco, shrink when protection is removed. Increases 
in production are observed in Insurance and Finance. Import penetration in this sector 
                                                 
13 As indicated earlier, deriving an appropriate aggregate tariff rate for an aggregate commodity is 
complex. It is worth noting that some components of some aggregates are taxed at a rate lower 
than 7%. So, the 7% flat rate does represent a tariff rate increase for some commodities when a 
more detailed level of disaggregation is considered. 
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is fairly large at about 30% of the value of domestic consumption. The devaluation 
enables this sector to compete more effectively against imports and hence increase 
value added. The devaluation also increases the local currency value of foreign capital 
inflows. Since most of these inflows fund investment expenditure, investment spend-
ing increases spurring activity in, for example, the construction sector. An intuitive 
explanation of the decline in value added produced by the livestock sector will be de-
ferred for later. 
 
Table 7. Real value added by sector.  
 
 
 
 
Base
Share (%)
Base
Level
All
products
pay (%)
Flat 
tariff
rates (%) Both (%)
 
Primary Ag. Crops 27.4 9,963 -0.4 0.8 0.0
Primary Ag. Livestock 2.2 795 -2.1 0.3 -1.6
Forestry and Firewood 3.2 1,156 0.2 0.2 0.3
Extraction 4.3 1,570 2.4 0.5 2.3
Food Processing 3.3 1,198 -1.6 -1.2 -1.9
Beverages and Tobacco 0.9 313 -5.3 -3.1 -5.9
Primary Product Processing 2.2 802 -3.0 -3.2 -4.0
Chemicals 0.6 231 -1.7 0.4 -1.3
Other Manufactures 1.1 410 0.3 0.6 0.4
Other Services 8.3 3,018 -0.9 -0.4 -1.0
Construction 6.5 2,375 3.3 -0.2 2.6
Commerce 20.1 7,337 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3
Transport and Communication 8.9 3,236 0.0 -0.2 -0.1
Insurance and Finance  4.6 1,682 3.1 0.1 2.6
Public Administration and Def. 2.8 1,007 0.0 0.0 0.0
Education 1.6 601 -0.7 -0.2 -0.7
Health 0.5 179 -0.5 -0.1 -0.5
Labor Intensive Services 1.5 550 0.4 0.1 0.4 
 
 
Table 8 provides information on factor prices. In all scenarios, all wages and rental 
rates increase relative to the base. The increases range from about 1.5% to 1.8% for 
all factors. This implies that all households lacking access to duty free imports benefit 
from the policy change. These are compelling results that are relatively simple to ex-
plain. Two broad effects dominate these increases in real wages.  
 
First, the figures reported in Table 8 are real factor prices with deflation being per-
formed by the consumer price index (the numeraire). As indicated above, the three 
commodities with the highest rates of protection (Processed Food, Beverages and To-
bacco, and Processed Primary Products) represent a significant share of the consumer 
consumption bundle. When protection is removed, prices for these commodities de-
cline. Since the level of the consumer price index is fixed as numeraire, the level of 
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the consumer price index (CPI) cannot decline by definition. Only relative prices mat-
ter in a CGE model. As a result, other prices, including factor prices, tend to rise rela-
tive to the CPI in order to achieve a relative decline in the prices of the basket of 
goods comprising the CPI.  
 
Table 8. Real (CPI deflated) wages  
  
 
Base
All products
pay (%)
Flat Tariff
rates (%)
 
Both (%) 
  
Unskilled Ag Labor 1.63 0.6 2.1 1.6 
Skilled Ag Labor 2.66 0.5 2.2 1.6 
Unskilled Non-Ag Labor 6.99 1.4 0.5 1.5 
Skilled Non-Ag Labor 23.96 1.9 0.2 1.8 
Highly Skilled Non-Ag Labor 57.03 1.9 0.2 1.8 
Capital 0.15 1.5 0.9 1.8  
 
 
Second, as indicated earlier, the rents that accrue from importing duty-free and resell-
ing on the domestic market at tariff laden prices function in a manner analogous to 
imposing a tariff and having the government reimburse these “tariff payments” back 
to those relatively few individuals with the right to import duty-free. In a macroeco-
nomic sense, the rents from duty-free importation and subsequent resale function like 
a tariff (an indirect tax) that is later reimbursed (a direct transfer) to selected individu-
als.14 Reductions in these “transfers”, through tariff rate reductions (which lower the 
implicit value of the rents) or reductions in the share of goods imported duty free, 
function like reductions in standard tariffs with concomitant reductions in transfers.  
 
The macroeconomic impact on wages can best be perceived by considering a funda-
mental national accounting identity:  
 
ITGDPfcGDPMXGIC             )    (            +==−+++  
 
where C is consumption, I is investment, G is government, X is exports, M is imports, 
GDP is gross domestic product, GDPfc is GDP at factor cost, and IT is total indirect 
taxes. The right hand side of the above expression can be rewritten as: 
 
∑ +++ oroii ITTRTRwE              
                                                 
14 Direct consumption of duty free imports, on the other hand, functions as if the government had 
imposed a tariff a tariff at the border and then given back the revenue in the form of a commodity 
specific consumption subsidy. These two indirect taxes exactly offset one another. 
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where Ei represents the quantity of each factor employed, wi represents the wage for 
each factor, TRo represents official tariff revenue, TRr represents rents from resale of 
goods imported duty free, and ITo represents other sources of indirect tax revenue. 
The sum of employment of endowments (land/natural resources, labor, capital, human 
capital) multiplied by their respective wages yields GDP at factor cost. The sum of 
the three tax components gives total indirect taxes. 
 
In the simulations considered here, endowment supplies are fixed and fully employed. 
Hence, the only way to increase nominal GDP at factor cost is to increase wages. By 
assumption in each scenario, the sum TRo + ITo is held constant. The remaining term 
represents the rents from resale of goods imported duty free, TRr. In scenarios one 
and three, this value is reduced from about 2.4% of GDP at factor cost to zero. If 
nominal GDP remained constant and TRr were the only source of indirect tax reve-
nue, average wages would have to increase by about 2.4%. In the event, nominal (CPI 
deflated) GDP declines by about 0.6% and other indirect tax revenue sources remain 
in place (at a constant value). Simple calculations indicate that average factor prices 
must rise by slightly more than 1.7%, which is approximately the weighted average 
factor price change value one obtains from Table 8. 
 
This effect on nominal wages often leads to the erroneous conclusion that trade liber-
alization increases household and economy-wide welfare due to the wage effect. As 
pointed out by Robinson and Thierfelder (1999), this is not necessarily the case. For 
example, if the tariff revenue is replaced by direct taxes such as income taxes, house-
holds might find that the increase in income taxes more than offsets the “wage in-
crease” that follows from reductions in indirect tax revenue. In this instance, the 
household is not better off. More generally, using factor prices as a welfare indicator 
in trade liberalization scenarios will tend to overstate the benefits of trade liberaliza-
tion if the implications of reductions in government tariff revenue are not accounted 
for. 
 
In this case, in order to conduct an acceptable welfare analysis using wages, we must 
account, not for the reduction in tariff revenue actually collected (which remains es-
sentially constant), but for the reduction in rents accrued to those with the ability to 
import duty free. Even though we know relatively little about these people, it seems 
safe to assume that they are not particularly numerous and that they are not poor. For 
these relatively few individuals (such as corrupt border guards), the reductions in the 
rents received will almost surely exceed the average increment to wages predicted by 
the model. Hence, their welfare declines. However, for the large majority of working 
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people who lack access to duty free imports, wages are an acceptable welfare indica-
tor. The results indicate that wages for these people will rise (with no offsetting 
reduction in rents).   
 
A composite view of welfare effects on households can be obtained by examining 
household equivalent variation. This is done in Table 9. As shown in the Table, urban 
household welfare declines very substantially while rural household welfare increases 
substantially (these are large numbers for trade policy simulations where welfare 
changes are often on the order of one percent). The decline in urban household wel-
fare is attributable entirely to the disappearance of rents from resale of products im-
ported duty free, which formerly accounted for about 5.6% of total income. If the in-
formation existed to divide urban households into those receiving rents and those not 
receiving rents, simple calculations indicate that urban households not receiving rents 
would experience welfare gains of about two percent.15   
 
Table 9. Household welfare measured by equivalent variation in the non-
gendered model  
  
 
Base
All products
pay (%)
Flat Tariff
rates (%)
 
Both (%) 
  
Urban 15,891 -3.6 -1.1 -3.8 
Rural 20,102 1.6 1.1 1.9  
 
 
We turn now to the gender dimensioned model. Not surprisingly, the macroeconomic 
effects between the gender dimensioned and non-gender dimensioned models are very 
similar. This is illustrated in Table 10, which shows household equivalent variation. 
While not exactly the same, the results are qualitatively very similar. The more inter-
esting stories potentially involve implications for wages. However, for the scenario of 
policy interest (scenario three: “Both”), the implications of a flat tariff rate and the 
elimination of duty free imports are remarkably consistent across factor types. As il-
lustrated in Table 8, returns to all factors increase by 1.5 to 1.8 percent. When factors 
                                                 
15 This aggregation of urban households into a single average helps to explain the somewhat coun-
terintuitive decline in livestock production shown in Table 7. Urban households are, on average, 
considerably wealthier than rural households; and they direct a much larger fraction of their in-
come to meat consumption. When average urban household income declines, direct demand for 
livestock products declines as well. In addition, marketed meat products (butchered animals) are 
considered processed foods. With declines in domestic processed food production following re-
ductions in tariffs, intermediate demand for livestock products as well. A more detailed analysis 
with more disaggregate data would provide a more precise insight into production effects for the 
livestock sector. 
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are split between male and female types, this relatively uniform impact upon wages 
persists. As a result, the story for female wages is qualitatively very similar to the 
story for wages in general. 
 
Table 10. Household welfare measured by equivalent variation in the gendered 
model  
  
 
Base
All products
pay (%)
Flat Tariff
rates (%)
 
Both (%) 
  
Urban 15,906 -3.9 -1.1 -3.8 
Rural 20,111 1.6 1.0 1.9  
 
 
The relative uniformity in implications for factor returns stem from the relatively mild 
effects on the structure of production. As shown in Table 1, Food Processing, Bever-
ages and Tobacco, and Primary Product Processing are the sectors with the highest 
tariff rates (plus a high level of import penetration). As a result, these sectors can be 
expected to be the ones most strongly affected by trade liberalization. However, as 
shown in Table 1, these sectors represent only about 6.4% of value added and do not 
employ a particularly large concentration of any one factor. In addition, the estimated 
Armington elasticities of substitution between imported and domestic produced goods 
for these sectors are relatively small at 0.8 (Arndt, Robinson and Tarp 2002) implying 
relatively small domestic production adjustment despite the price changes. Changes in 
household income between rural and urban groups does generate changes in the over-
all composition of commodity demand due to differing marginal budget shares be-
tween the two groups; however, these compositional effects are relatively mild. 16 If 
the structure of production is to remain relatively constant, relative factor prices must 
remain relatively constant as well, which is what we observe. As a result, the overall 
macroeconomic effect on factor prices from elimination of rents from duty free im-
porting discussed above tends to dominate the results.  
 
The splitting of labor into male and female components does permit analysis of total 
wage payments to women and men. This is shown in Table 11. Here, due to the rela-
tively uniform impacts on wages, relative uniformity prevails despite the quite differ-
ent structures of the male and female labor forces in terms of skills profile. Total 
payments to female and male labor both increase by about 1.6%, a significant incre-
ment.17  
                                                 
16 Since preferences are assumed homothetic, changes in household income do not change the com-
position of commodity demand by the household (ceterus paribus). 
17 It should be pointed out that relatively uniform impacts on male and female classes of labor are 
not necessarily a foregone conclusion in this class of model. Fontana and Wood (2000), Arndt 
and Tarp (2000), and Fontana (2003) generate differential gender impacts.  
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Table 11. Returns to male and female labor  
  
 
Base
All products
pay (%)
Flat Tariff
rates (%)
 
Both (%) 
  
Urban 9,599 1.1 1.4 1.6 
Rural 15,588 1.4 0.8 1.6  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to conduct a trade policy analysis with specific attention 
paid to disaggregating male and female labor, so as to track any efficiency and distri-
butional consequences this may have for the conclusions emerging from an aggregate 
non-gendered approach. We have at the same time made a novel attempt at capturing 
the importance of divergences between average and marginal tariff rates. The differ-
ences between de jure and de facto trade policy are, as discussed in this paper, sig-
nificant in Mozambique, and the modelling dilemmas involved in addressing this 
have traditionally been far from straight forward. On this background, we develop a 
simple theoretical model of marginal and average tariff rates. Motivated by this theo-
retical model (as well as some conceptual similarities with the modelling of tariff rate 
quotas (TRQs)), the CGE model was then adjusted to address this issue. 
 
Our results indicate that there are possibilities for increasing both efficiency and eq-
uity. Losers from trade reforms include those households (urban households by as-
sumption) who benefited from their ability to import duty free one way or the other. It 
is highly unlikely that these rent-creaming households are particularly poor. In con-
trast, the welfare of poor rural families tends to increase in both the non-gendered and 
the gendered version of the CGE model applied here. In scenario “Both” where a flat 
tariff rate is applied and all duty-free importation ceases, rural household welfare as 
measured by equivalent variation increases by about 1.9% in both the gendered and 
non-gendered approaches. The implications for wages are strongly positive and re-
markably uniform indicating that the large majority of the urban population that does 
not enjoy access to duty free goods becomes better off following reforms. The uni-
formity in results across factors suggests that, at the level of aggregation used in this 
paper, it is difficult to uncover any major differential gender impacts of trade reforms. 
This obviously does not rule out that some smaller, more specific groups of poorer 
women may loose out following reforms, but our results are encouraging in the sense 
that trade policy reform does appear to benefit women as much as men at the aggrega-
tion level applied here. Future research would be required to establish in more detail 
the implications for intra-household resource allocations. 
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